e which are not cows (e.g. buffaloes) have also horns. Thus,
it seems that when Pras'astapada says that he is giving us the view
of Ka@nada he is faithful to it. Pras'astapada says that wherever
there is smoke there is fire, if there is no fire there is no smoke.
When one knows this concomitance and unerringly perceives the
smoke, he remembers the concomitance and feels certain that
there is fire. But with regard to Ka@nada's enumeration of types of
inference such as "a cause is inferred from its effect, or an effect
from the cause," etc., Pras'astapada holds that these are not the
only types of inference, but are only some examples for showing
the general nature of inference. Inference merely shows a connection
such that from this that can be inferred. He then divides
inference into two classes, d@r@s@ta (from the experienced characteristics
of one member of a class to another member of the same
class), and samanyato d@r@s@ta. D@r@s@ta (perceived resemblance) is
that where the previously known case and the inferred case is
exactly of the same class. Thus as an example of it we can point
out that by perceiving that only a cow has a hanging mass of
flesh on its neck (_sasna_), I can whenever I see the same hanging

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mass of flesh at the neck of an animal infer that it is a cow. But
when on the strength of a common quality the inference is extended
to a different class of objects, it is called samanyato d@r@s@ta.
Thus on perceiving that the work of the peasants is rewarded
with a good harvest I may infer that the work of the priests,
namely the performance of sacrifices, will also be rewarded with
the objects for which they are performed (i.e. the attainment of
heaven). When the conclusion, to which one has arrived (_svanis'citartha_)
is expressed in five premisses for convincing others
who are either in doubt, or in error or are simply ignorant, then
the inference is called pararthanumana. We know that the distinction
of svarthanumana (inference for oneself) and pararthanumana
(inference for others) was made by the Jains and Buddhists.
Pras'astapada does not make a sharp distinction of two classes
of inference, but he seems to mean that what one infers, it can be
conveyed to others by means of five premisses in which case it is
called pararthanumana. But this need not be considered as an
entirely new innovation of Pras'astapada, for in IX. 2, Ka@nada
himself definitely alludes to this distinction (_asyeda@m
karyy