t available (e.g. from sunset the rise of stars is
inferred). Thus it is that the invariable concomitance of the
li@nga with the li@ngin, as safeguarded by the conditions noted
above, is what leads us to make a valid inference [Footnote ref l].

We perceived in many cases that a li@nga (e.g. smoke) was
associated with a li@ngin (fire), and had thence formed the notion

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyayamanjari_ on anumana.]

346

that wherever there was smoke there was fire. Now when we
perceived that there was smoke in yonder hill, we remembered
the concomitance (_vyapti_) of smoke and fire which we had
observed before, and then since there was smoke in the hill,
which was known to us to be inseparably connected with fire, we
concluded that there was fire in the hill. The discovery of the
li@nga (smoke) in the hill as associated with the memory of its
concomitance with fire (_t@rtiya-li@nga-paramars'a) is thus the cause
(_anumitikara@na_ or _anumana_) of the inference (_anumiti_). The
concomitance of smoke with fire is technically called _vyapti._ When
this refers to the concomitance of cases containing smoke with
those having fire, it is called _bahirvyapti_; and when it refers to the
conviction of the concomitance of smoke with fire, without any
relation to the circumstances under which the concomitance was
observed, it is called _antarvyapti._ The Buddhists since they did
not admit the notions of generality, etc. preferred antarvyapti
view of concomitance to bahirvyapti as a means of inference [Footnote ref
1].

Now the question arises that since the validity of an inference
will depend mainly on the validity of the concomitance of sign
(_hetu_) with the signate (_sadhya_), how are we to assure ourselves in
each case that the process of ascertaining the concomitance (_vyaptigraha_)
had been correct, and the observation of concomitance
had been valid. The Mima@msa school held, as we shall see in
the next chapter, that if we had no knowledge of any such case
in which there was smoke but no fire, and if in all the cases
I knew I had perceived that wherever there was smoke there
was fire, I could enunciate the concomitance of smoke with fire.
But Nyaya holds that it is not enough that in all cases where
there is smoke there should be fire, but it is necessary that in
all those cases where there is no fire there should not be any
smoke, i.e. not only ever