ed here as the principal condition of the object, and as
itself repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance
has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must
needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.
Reply Obj. 1: A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is
considered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as
being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.
Reply Obj. 2: A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance,
does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but
when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does
specify the action.
Reply Obj. 3: It is not every circumstance that places the moral
action in the species of good or evil; since not every circumstance
implies accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one
action may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in
many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should
not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as said above (A.
7, ad 1; Q. 1, A. 3, ad 3).
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ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 11]
Whether Every Circumstance That Makes an Action Better or Worse,
Places a Moral Action in a Species of Good or Evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that every circumstance relating to
good or evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific
differences of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a
difference in the goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a
specific difference, which is the same as to make it differ in
species. Now that which makes an action better or worse, makes it
differ in goodness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in
species. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better
or worse, constitutes a species.
Obj. 2: Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself the
character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot
make the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot
make a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a greater
evil. But if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this
very reason it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore every
circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a new
species of good or evil.
Obj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is
caused by each single defect." Now every circumstance that increase
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