barren woman, i.e. a mere
non-entity, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren
woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of
some causal agent, in that case it would be possible also that the
non-existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the
activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take
place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son
of the barren woman are both equally non-entities and can never
be.--But, the asatkaryavadin here objects, from your doctrine there
follows the result that the activity of causal agents is altogether
purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in
the cause and were non-different from it, nobody would endeavour to
bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause
which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as
a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and
it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether
useless that we assume the non-existence of the effect previously to its
origination.--Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration
that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a
purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the
effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something
previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already
because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have
already shown above.--Nor does a substance become another substance
merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time
be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another
time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same
substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also
by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c.,
remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and
attitudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers,
and so on. If our opponent objects to this last illustrative example on
the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial
beings, because the different states in which they appear are not
separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for
instance a jar, appears only after the cause, for instan