n, that milk and other
substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so
on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to
bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental
cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last
effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes,
and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms
concerning the phenomenal world.
The conclusion here established, on the ground of reasoning, viz. that
the effect exists already before its origination, and is non-different
from its cause, results also from a different scriptural passage. As
under the preceding Sutra a Vedic passage was instanced which speaks of
the non-existing, the different passage referred to in the present Sutra
is the one (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1) which refers to that which is. That
passage begins, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one without a
second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being
the cause of the world ('Others say, Non-being was this in the
beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine ('How could that
which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, reaffirms the
view first set forth, 'Only Being was this in the beginning.' The
circumstance that in this passage the effect, which is denoted by the
word 'this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its
origination, coordinated with the cause denoted by the term 'Being,'
proves that the effect exists in--and is non-different from--the cause.
If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in
its cause by samavaya, it would be something different from the cause,
and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the
passage, 'That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c. (VI,
1, 3). The latter assertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the
comprehension that the effect exists in--and is not different from-the
cause.
19. And like a piece of cloth.
As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a
piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it
becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth; and as, so
long as it is folded, we perhaps know that it is a piece of cloth but
not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded
we know these particulars, and at the
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