ce the clay, has
undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon
as something altogether different from the cause); we rebut this
objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for
instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the
condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no
right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those
cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as,
for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there
spring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' (when applied to the sprout)
only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by
becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles
of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession
of those particles, the cause again passes beyond the sphere of
visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and
death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes
existing, and the existing non-existing; for if that were so, it would
also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born
babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.

It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood,
manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are
illegitimately used.--The preceding arguments may also be used to refute
the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only[300].

The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual
origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the
causal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be
an object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other
weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the
inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous conclusion that
from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the
inherent cause, there results something else (viz. the effect). And if
(in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say
that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a
certain relative power (ati/s/aya) of the inherent cause; he thereby
would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists
in the cause already.

We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusio