but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part.
If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be
that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its
parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail.
But such things are not seen to take place.

We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine
that the effect does not exist in the cause.--That doctrine involves the
conclusion that the actual origination of an effect is without an agent
and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and
as such requires an agent[298], just as the action of walking does. To
speak of an action without an agent would be a contradiction. But if you
deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be
assumed that whenever the origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken
of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist)
but something else, and again that when the origination of the two
halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but
something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 'the jar is
originated' means as much as 'the potter and the other (operative)
causes are originated[299].' But as a matter of fact the former sentence
is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that
at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in
existence.--Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origination is
the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its
obtaining existence as a Self.--How, we ask in reply, can something
which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something
else? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one
existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To
something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is
moreover not possible to assign a limit as the opponent does when
maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for
experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and
houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use,
for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren
woman was king previously to the coronation of Pur/n/avarman' the
declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in
reality determine that the son of the