antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origination),
you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause,
and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the
other hand, you understand by the ati/s/aya a certain power of the cause
assumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined
effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can
determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause
and effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be
different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than
cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the
particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with
the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of
that power.--Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand
and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones,
as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that
the identity of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and
its qualities has to be admitted. Let it then be assumed, the opponent
rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are
not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called
samavaya connexion[293].--If, we reply, you assume the samavaya
connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the
samavaya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which
are connected by samavaya, and then that connexion will again require a
new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and
you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of
connexions; or else you will have to maintain that the samavaya is not
joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from
that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two
terms of the samavaya relation[294].--Well then, the opponent rejoins,
let us assume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a connexion
may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any
further connexion.--Then, we reply, conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also must be
connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the
samavaya connexion; for conjunction also is a kind of
connexion[295].--Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are
apprehended as standin