beginning this was non-existent only,' we remark that
what is there denoted by the word 'Non-existing' is--in the
complementary passage, 'That became existent'--referred to by the word
'that,' and qualified as 'Existent.'
The word 'was' would, moreover, not apply to the (absolutely)
Non-existing, which cannot be conceived as connected with prior or
posterior time.--Hence with reference to the other passage also,
'Non-existing indeed,' &c., the complementary part, 'That made itself
its Self,' shows, by the qualification which it contains, that absolute
Non-existence is not meant.--It follows from all this that the
designation of 'Non-existence' applied to the effect before its
production has reference to a different state of being merely. And as
those things which are distinguished by name and form are in ordinary
language called 'existent,' the term 'non-existent' is figuratively
applied to them to denote the state in which they were previously to
their differentiation.
18. From reasoning and from another Vedic passage.
That the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from
the cause, follows from reasoning as well as from a further scriptural
passage.
We at first set forth the argumentation.--Ordinary experience teaches us
that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or
earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain
determined causal substances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who
wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to
make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which
teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production),
all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all
effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then
should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars
from clay only and not from milk as well?--Let us then maintain, the
asatkaryavadin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of
any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance
has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (ati/s/aya) for some
particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance,
milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay
only, and not milk, an analogous capacity for jars.--What, we ask in
return, do you understand by that 'ati/s/aya?' If you understand by it
the
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