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eral judges in recent years have, however, restored something like the broader conception of the term which Madison and Hamilton had endorsed. In 1913 Judge Archbald of the Commerce Court was removed from office by the impeachment process, and disqualified to hold and enjoy any office of honor, profit or trust under the Constitution, for soliciting for himself and friends valuable favors from railroad companies some of which were at the time litigants in his court, although it was conceded that in so doing he had not committed an indictable offense;[486] and in 1936 Judge Ritter of the Florida district court was similarly removed for conduct in relation to a receivership case which evoked serious doubts as to his integrity, although on the specific charges against him he was acquitted.[487] It is probable that in both these instances the final result was influenced by the consideration that judges of the United States hold office during "good behavior" and that the impeachment process is the only method indicated by the Constitution for determining whether a judge's behavior has been "good." In other words, as to judges of the United States at least lack of "good behavior" and "high crimes and misdemeanors" are overlapping if not precisely coincidental concepts.[488] Notes [1] As is pointed out by Hamilton in The Federalist No. 69. [2] Charles C. Thach, The Creation of the Presidency, 1775-1789 (Baltimore, 1922), 36-37. [3] Ibid. 109. [4] Max Farrand, Records, II, 185. [5] Ibid. II, 572 (September 10), 597. [6] Annals of Congress 383 ff. [7] Ibid. 396-397; 481-482. For a thorough-going review and evaluation of this debate, _see_ James Hart, The American Presidency in Action, 152-214 (New York, 1948). [8] Works of Alexander Hamilton, VII, 76, 80-81 (J.C. Hamilton, ed., New York, 1851). Hamilton was here simply interpreting the executive power clause in light of the views of Blackstone, Locke, and Montesquieu as to the location of power in the conduct of foreign relations. _See_ Edward S. Corwin, The President, Office and Powers (3d ed.), 459-460. For a parallel argument to Hamilton's respecting "the judicial power of the United States," article 1, section 1, clause 1, _see_ Justice Brewer's opinion in Kansas _v._ Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 82 (1907). [9] Myers _v._ United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). [10] Ibid. 118. [11] 299 U.S. 304 (1936). [12] Ibid. 315-316, 318. _See also_ Ibid. 319 citing
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