FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   581   582   583   584   585   586   587   588   589   590   591   592   593   594   595   596   597   598   599   600   601   602   603   604   605  
606   607   608   609   610   611   612   613   614   615   616   617   618   619   620   621   622   623   624   625   626   627   628   629   630   >>   >|  
ndian] titles confirmed many years before * * *" [173] United States _v._ Schooner Peggy, 1 Cr. 103 (1801). [174] Foster _v._ Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829). [175] United States _v._ Percheman, 7 Pet. 51 (1833). [176] Willoughby, On the Constitution, I, (2d ed.), 555. [177] 288 U.S. 102 (1933). [178] Ibid. 107-122. [179] 124 U.S. 190 (1888). [180] It is arguable that the maximum _leget posteriores_ is not the most eligible rule for determining conflicts between "laws of the United States * * * made in pursuance thereof" (i.e. of the Constitution) and "treaties made * * * under the authority of the United States". It may be that the former, being mentioned immediately after "this Constitution" and before "treaties," are entitled always to prevail over the latter, just as both acts of Congress and treaties yield to the Constitution. [181] 1 Stat. 578. [182] 4 Dall. 37 (1800). [183] Crandall, Treaties (2d ed.), 458; _See_ Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IV, 2245; and Benton, 15 Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, 478. Mangum of North Carolina denied that Congress could authorize the President to give notice: "He entertained not a particle of doubt that the question never could have been thrown upon Congress unless as a war or _quasi_ war measure. * * * Congress had no power of making or breaking a treaty." He owned, however, that he might appear singular in his view of the matter. Ibid. 472. [184] Crandall, 458-462; Wright, The Control of American Foreign Relations, 258. [185] 38 Stat. 1164. [186] Crandall, 460. [187] _See_ Jesse S. Reeves, The Jones Act and the Denunciation of Treaties, 15 American Journal of International Law (January, 1921) 33-38. Among other precedents which call into question the exclusive significance of the legislative role in the termination of treaties as international conventions is one mentioned by Mr. Taft: "In my administration the lower house passed a resolution directing the abrogation of the Russian Treaty of 1832, couched in terms which would have been most offensive to Russia, and it did this by a vote so nearly unanimous as to indicate that in the Senate, too, the same resolution would pass. It would have strained our relations with Russia in a way that seemed unwise. The treaty was an old one, and its construction had been constantly the subject of controversy between the two countries, and therefore, to obviate what I felt would produce unneces
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   581   582   583   584   585   586   587   588   589   590   591   592   593   594   595   596   597   598   599   600   601   602   603   604   605  
606   607   608   609   610   611   612   613   614   615   616   617   618   619   620   621   622   623   624   625   626   627   628   629   630   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

Congress

 
treaties
 

United

 

States

 
Constitution
 

Crandall

 
mentioned
 

American

 

Russia

 

resolution


treaty

 

Treaties

 

question

 

January

 

conventions

 

International

 

Denunciation

 
Journal
 

significance

 

legislative


termination
 

exclusive

 
precedents
 
international
 

Reeves

 

Wright

 

matter

 

singular

 
Control
 

Schooner


Foreign

 
Relations
 

administration

 

unwise

 

strained

 

relations

 

construction

 

obviate

 

produce

 

unneces


countries

 

constantly

 

subject

 

controversy

 

abrogation

 
directing
 

Russian

 
Treaty
 

confirmed

 

passed