Price Control
Act of 1942 was sustained. This act provided for a special Emergency
Court of Appeals which, subject to review by the Supreme Court, was
given exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of regulations,
orders, and price schedules issued by the Office of Price
Administration. The Emergency Court and the Emergency Court alone was
permitted to enjoin regulations or orders of OPA, and even it could
enjoin such orders only after finding that the order was not in
accordance with law, or was arbitrary or capricious. The Emergency Court
was expressly denied power to issue temporary restraining orders or
interlocutory decrees; and in addition the effectiveness of any
permanent injunction it might issue was to be postponed for thirty days.
If review was sought in the Supreme Court by certiorari, effectiveness
was to be postponed until final disposition. A unanimous court speaking
through Chief Justice Stone declared that there "is nothing in the
Constitution which requires Congress to confer equity jurisdiction on
any particular inferior federal court." All federal courts, other than
the Supreme Court, it was asserted, derive their jurisdiction solely
from the exercise of the authority to ordain and establish inferior
courts conferred on Congress by article III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution.
This power, which Congress is left free to exercise or not, was held to
include the power "'of investing them with jurisdiction either limited,
concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in
the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for
the public good.'"[77] Although the Court avoided passing upon the
constitutionality of the prohibition against interlocutory decrees, the
language of the Court was otherwise broad enough to support it, as was
the language of Yakus _v._ United States[78] which sustained a different
phase of the special procedure for appeals under the Emergency Price
Control Act.
THE RULE-MAKING POWER AND POWERS OVER PROCESS
Among the incidental powers of courts is that of making all necessary
rules governing their process and practice and for the orderly conduct
of their business.[79] However, this power too is derived from the
statutes and cannot go beyond them. The landmark case is Wayman _v._
Southard[80] which sustained the validity of the process acts of 1789
and 1792 as a valid exercise of authority under the necessary and proper
clause. Although C
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