conveys no
power to create a record or re-create one of which no evidence
exists.[86]
APPOINTMENT OF REFEREES, MASTERS, AND SPECIAL AIDS
The administration of insolvent enterprises, investigations into the
reasonableness of public utility rates, and the performance of other
judicial functions often require the special services of masters in
chancery, referees, auditors, and other special aids. The practice of
referring pending actions to a referee was held in Heckers _v._
Fowler[87] to be coeval with the organization of the federal courts. In
the leading case of Ex parte Peterson[88] a United States district court
appointed an auditor with power to compel the attendance of witnesses
and the production of testimony. The Court authorized him to conduct a
preliminary investigation of facts and file a report thereon for the
purpose of simplifying the issues for the jury. This action was neither
authorized nor prohibited by statute. In sustaining the action of the
district judge, Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, declared:
"Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the contrary)
inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments
required for the performance of their duties. * * * This power includes
authority to appoint persons unconnected with the Court to aid judges in
the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the
progress of a cause."[89] The power to appoint auditors by federal
courts sitting in equity has been exercised from their very beginning,
and here it was held that this power is the same whether the Court sits
in law or equity.
THE POWER TO ADMIT AND DISBAR ATTORNEYS
Subject to general statutory qualifications for attorneys, the power of
the federal courts to admit and disbar attorneys rests on the common law
from which it was originally derived. According to Chief Justice Taney,
it was well settled by the common law that "it rests exclusively with
the Court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers,
as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed." Such power, he made clear, however, "is not an arbitrary and
despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the Court, or from
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; but it is the duty of the
Court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial
discretion, whereby the rights and independence of the bar may be as
scrupulously guarded and m
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