a perplexing
problem, for it was held 'difficult, if not impossible,' to define this
boundary with exactness."[396] Nor, he continued, has the Court been
able "to give any guiding, definite rule to determine the extent of
state power in advance of litigation, and has held that the margins of
state authority must 'be determined in view of surrounding circumstances
as cases arise.'"[397] As to the specific claim involved in the Davis
Case, Justice Black stated further that it was "fair to say that a
number of cases can be cited both in behalf of and in opposition to
recovery here."[398] Concurring in the Davis Case, Justice Frankfurter
referred to the Jensen case as "that ill-starred decision," but agreed
that reversal would not eliminate its resultant complexities and
confusions until Congress attempted another comprehensive solution of
the problem. Until then all the Court could do was "to bring order out
of the remaining judicial chaos as marginal situations" were
presented.[399]

POWER OF CONGRESS TO MODIFY THE MARITIME LAW; THE "LOTTAWANNA"

In view of the chaos created by the Jensen case and its apparent
disharmony with earlier as well as some later decisions the question
arises as to the scope of Congress's power to revise and codify the
maritime law. In the "Lottawanna"[400] Justice Bradley as spokesman of
the Court, while admitting the existence of a general body of maritime
law, asserted that it is operative as law only insofar "as it is adopted
by the laws and usages of that country,"[401] subject to such
modifications and qualifications as may be made. So adopted and
qualified it becomes the law of a particular nation, but not until then.
"That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout the United
States, cannot be doubted. The general system of maritime law which was
familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country when the
Constitution was adopted, was most certainly intended and referred to
when it was declared in that instrument that the judicial power of the
United States shall extend 'to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction.'" Continuing, Justice Bradley stated that "the
Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with and
operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have
been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under
the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have
defeated the uniformi