FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   710   711   712   713   714   715   716   717   718   719   720   721   722   723   724   725   726   727   728   729   730   731   732   733   734  
735   736   737   738   739   740   741   742   743   744   745   746   747   748   749   750   751   752   753   754   755   756   757   758   759   >>   >|  
ns liberally[632] in every case except United States _v._ United Mine Workers,[633] where it was held that the statute did not apply to suits brought by the United States to enjoin a strike in the coal industry while the Government technically was operating the mines. JUDICIAL POWER EQUATED WITH DUE PROCESS OF LAW Although the cases point to a plenary power in Congress to withhold jurisdiction from the inferior courts and to withdraw it at any time after it has been conferred, even as applied to pending cases, there are a few cases in addition to Martin _v._ Hunter's Lessee[634] which slightly qualify the cumulative effect of this impressive array of precedents. As early as 1856, the Supreme Court in Murray _v._ Hoboken Land and Improvement Co.[635] distinguished between matters of private right which from their nature were the subject of a suit at the common law, equity, or admiralty and cannot be withdrawn from judicial cognizance and those matters of public right which, though susceptible of judicial determination, did not require it and which might or might not be brought within judicial cognizance. Seventy-seven years later the Court elaborated this distinction in Crowell _v._ Benson,[636] which involved the finality to be accorded administrative findings of jurisdictional facts in compensation cases. In holding that an employer was entitled to a trial _de novo_ of the constitutional jurisdictional facts of the matter of the employer-employee relationship and of the occurrence of the injury in interstate commerce, Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the majority fused the due process clause of Amendment V and article III, but emphasized that the issue ultimately was "rather a question of the appropriate maintenance of the Federal judicial power," and "whether the Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in which the judicial power of the United States is vested, an administrative agency * * * for the final determination of the existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend." To do so, contended the Chief Justice, "would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution and to establish a government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever constitutional rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law."[637] JUDICIAL _VERSUS_ NO
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   710   711   712   713   714   715   716   717   718   719   720   721   722   723   724   725   726   727   728   729   730   731   732   733   734  
735   736   737   738   739   740   741   742   743   744   745   746   747   748   749   750   751   752   753   754   755   756   757   758   759   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
judicial
 
constitutional
 

United

 

States

 

depend

 
finality
 

matters

 

Justice

 

employer

 

effect


courts

 

Federal

 
Congress
 

rights

 
JUDICIAL
 

brought

 

cognizance

 

determination

 

administrative

 

jurisdictional


commerce

 
distinction
 

injury

 

interstate

 
elaborated
 

Crowell

 
speaking
 

Hughes

 
occurrence
 
employee

holding

 
findings
 
accorded
 

involved

 

matter

 
entitled
 
Benson
 

compensation

 

relationship

 

ultimately


exists
 

Constitution

 

establish

 
government
 

citizen

 

contended

 

bureaucratic

 

character

 

VERSUS

 

infrequently