feeling more unfavorable in case the judge should be asked
to act at some later date, any more than he can for exciting feeling
against a judge for what he already has done." Ibid. 281-282.
[37] 313 U.S. 33, 47-53 (1941).
[38] 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941). _See_ pp. 783-784 (Amendment I).
[39] 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
[40] 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
[41] Ibid. 534, 535.
[42] Ibid. 539.
[43] Sacher _v._ United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
[44] Dennis _v._ United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
[45] 343 U.S. 1, 11, 13-14. Justice Clark did not participate. Justices
Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas dissented. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
is accompanied by an elaborate review of exchanges between the trial
judge and defense counsel, excerpted from the record of the case. On the
constitutional issue he said: "Summary punishment of contempt is
concededly an exception to the requirements of Due Process. Necessity
dictates the departure. Necessity must bound its limits. In this case
the course of events to the very end of the trial shows that summary
measures were not necessary to enable the trial to go on. Departure from
established judicial practice, which makes it unfitting for a judge who
is personally involved to sit in his own case, was therefore
unwarranted. Neither self-respect nor the good name of the law required
it. Quite otherwise. Despite the many incidents of contempt that were
charged, the trial went to completion, nine months after the first
incident, without a single occasion making it necessary to lay any one
of the lawyers by the heel in order to assure that the trial proceed.
The trial judge was able to keep order and to continue the court's
business by occasional brief recesses calculated to cool passions and
restore decorum, by periodic warnings to defense lawyers, and by
shutting off obstructive arguments whenever rulings were concisely
stated and firmly held to." Ibid. 36. Justice Douglas summarized the
position of all three dissenters, as follows: "I agree with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter that one who reads this record will have difficulty in
determining whether members of the bar conspired to drive a judge from
the bench or whether the judge used the authority of the bench to
whipsaw the lawyers, to taunt and tempt them, and to create for himself
the role of the persecuted. I have reluctantly concluded that neither is
blameless, that there is fault on each side, that we have here the
spectacle of the benc
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