al cases
and deal with attempts to recover property under the Captured and
Abandoned Property Act by persons who claimed that they had given no aid
or comfort to the enemy. These cases are not, therefore, an
interpretation of the Constitution.

[731] 325 U.S. 1 (1945).

[732] 89 Law. Ed. 1443-1444 (Argument of Counsel).

[733] 325 U.S. 35.

[734] Ibid. 34-35. Earlier Justice Jackson had declared that this phase
of treason consists of two elements: "adherence to the enemy; and
rendering him aid and comfort." A citizen, it was said, may take actions
"which do aid and comfort the enemy--* * *--but if there is no adherence
to the enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, there is no
treason." Ibid. 29. Justice Jackson states erroneously that the
requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act was an original
invention of the Convention of 1787. Actually it comes from the British
Treason Trials Act of 1696 (7 and 8 Wm. III, C. 3).

[735] 330 U.S. 631 (1947).

[736] Ibid. 635-636.

[737] 330 U.S. 631, 645-646. Justice Douglas cites no cases for these
propositions. Justice Murphy in a solitary dissent stated: "But the act
of providing shelter was of the type that might naturally arise out of
petitioner's relationship to his son, as the Court recognizes. By its
very nature, therefore, it is a non-treasonous act. That is true even
when the act is viewed in light of all the surrounding circumstances.
All that can be said is that the problem of whether it was motivated by
treasonous or non-treasonous factors is left in doubt. It is therefore
not an overt act of treason, regardless of how unlawful it might
otherwise be." Ibid. 649. The following summary, taken from the Appendix
to the Government's brief in Cramer _v._ United States, 325 U.S. 1
(1945), and incorporated as note 38 in the Court's opinion (pp. 25-26),
contains all the cases in which, prior to Kawakita _v._ United States,
which is dealt with immediately below, construction of the treason
clause has been involved except grand jury charges and cases to which
interpretation of the clause was incidental: Whiskey Rebellion cases:
United States _v._ Vigol, 28 Fed. Cas. No. 16,621 (1795), United States
_v._ Mitchell, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,788 (1795) (constructive levying of
war, based on forcible resistance to execution of a statute; defendants
convicted and later pardoned). House tax case: Fries's Case, 9 Fed. Cas.
Nos. 5,126, 5,127 (1799, 1800) (constructive