his case was confirmed in McCready _v._
Virginia;[162] the logic of Geer _v._ Connecticut[163] extended the same
rule to wild game, and Hudson County Water Co. _v._ McCarter[164]
applied it to the running water of a State. In Toomer _v._ Witsell,[165]
however, the Court refused to apply this rule to free-swimming fish
caught in the three-mile belt off the coast of South Carolina. It held
instead that "commercial shrimping in the marginal sea, like other
common callings, is within the purview of the privileges and immunities
clause" and that a heavily discriminatory license fee exacted from
nonresidents was unconstitutional.[166] Universal practice has also
established another exception to which the Court gave approval by a
dictum in Blake _v._ McClung:[167] "A State may, by rule uniform in its
operation as to citizens of the several States, require residence within
its limits for a given time before a citizen of another State who
becomes a resident thereof shall exercise the right of suffrage or
become eligible to office."[168]

DISCRIMINATION IN PRIVATE RIGHTS

Not only has judicial construction of the comity clause excluded some
privileges of a public nature from its protection; the courts have also
established the proposition that the purely private and personal rights
to which the clause admittedly extends are not in all cases beyond the
reach of State legislation which differentiates citizens and
noncitizens. Broadly speaking, these rights are held subject to the
reasonable exercise by a State of its police power, and the Court has
recognized that there are cases in which discrimination against
nonresidents may be reasonably resorted to by a State in aid of its own
public health, safety and welfare. To that end a State may restrict the
right to sell insurance to persons who have resided within the State for
a prescribed period of time.[169] It may require a nonresident who does
business within the State[170] or who uses the highways of the
State[171] to consent, expressly or by implication, to service of
process on an agent within the State. Without violating this section, a
State may limit the dower rights of a nonresident to lands of which the
husband died seized while giving a resident dower in all lands held
during the marriage,[172] or may leave the rights of nonresident married
persons in respect of property within the State to be governed by the
laws of their domicile, rather than by the laws it promulgat