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was Justice Black in whose dissenting opinion Justice Douglas concurred. "The full faith and credit clause, as now interpreted, has become a disrupting influence. The Court in effect states that the clause does not apply to divorce actions, and that States alone have the right to determine what effect shall be given to the decrees of other States. If the Court is abandoning the principle that a marriage [valid where made is valid everywhere], a consequence is to subject people to bigamy or adultery prosecutions because they exercise their constitutional right to pass from a State in which they were validly married on to another which refuses to recognize their marriage. Such a consequence violates basic guarantees." North Carolina's interest was to preserve a bare marital status as to two persons who sought a divorce and two others who had not objected to it. "It is an extraordinary thing for a State to procure a retroactive invalidation of a divorce decree, and then punish one of its citizens for conduct authorized by that decree, when it had never been challenged by either of the people most immediately interested in it." The State here did not sue to protect any North Carolina property rights nor to obtain support for deserted families. "I would not permit such an attenuated state interest to override the Full Faith and Credit Clause * * *" (325 U.S. 226, 262-267 (1945)). The unsettling effect of this decision was expressed statistically by Justice Black as follows: "Statistics indicate that approximately five million divorced persons are scattered throughout the forty-eight States. More than 85% of these divorces were granted in uncontested proceedings. Not one of this latter group can now retain any feeling of security in his divorce decree. Ever present will be the danger of criminal prosecution and harassment." Ibid. 262-263. As to the conclusion that the Supreme Court as well as the State courts should reach in like situations, Justice Black asserted that "until Congress has commanded a different 'effect' for divorces granted on a short sojourn within a State, we should stay our hands. * * * If we follow that course, North Carolina cannot be permitted to disregard the Nevada decrees without passing upon the 'faith and credit' which Nevada itself would give to them under its own 'law or usage.' * * * For in Nevada, even its Attorney General could not have obtained a cancellation of the decree * * *." Ibid
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