. 267, 268.
The reader should take note of the effect in some of the above opinions
to weigh competing interests against one another and the implication
that the court's relation to the full faith and credit clause is that of
an arbitral tribunal rather than of a court in the conventional sense of
a body whose duty is to maintain an established rule of law.
[62] 325 U.S. 279 (1945).
[63] Ibid. 281-283.
[64] 334 U.S. 541 (1948). _See also_ the companion case of Kreiger _v._
Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555 (1948).
[65] Esenwein _v._ Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279, 280 (1945).
[66] Because the record, in his opinion, did not make it clear whether
New York "law" held that no "_ex parte_" divorce decree could terminate
a prior New York separate maintenance decree, or merely that no "_ex
parte_" decree of divorce of _another State_ could, Justice Frankfurter
dissented and recommended that the case be remanded for clarification.
Justice Jackson dissented on the ground that under New York law, a New
York divorce would terminate the wife's right to alimony; and if the
Nevada decree is good, it is entitled to no less effect in New York than
a local decree. However, for reasons stated in his dissent in the First
Williams Case, 317 U.S. 287, he would prefer not to give standing to
constructive service divorces obtained on short residence. 334 U.S. 541,
549-554 (1948). These two Justices filed similar dissents in the
companion case of Kreiger _v._ Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555, 557 (1948).
[67] 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
[68] 334 U.S. 378 (1948).--In a dissenting opinion filed in the case of
Sherrer _v._ Sherrer, but applicable also to the case of Coe _v._ Coe,
Justice Frankfurter, with Justice Murphy concurring, asserted his
inability to accept the proposition advanced by the majority that
"regardless of how overwhelming the evidence may have been that the
asserted domicile in the State offering bargain-counter divorces was a
sham, the home State of the parties is not permitted to question the
matter if the form of a controversy had been gone through."--334 U.S.
343, 377 (1948).
[69] 336 U.S. 674 (1949).--Of four Justices dissenting (Black, Douglas,
Rutledge, Jackson), Justice Jackson alone filed a written opinion. To
him the decision is "an example of the manner in which, in the law of
domestic relations, 'confusion now hath made his masterpiece,'" but for
the first Williams case and its progeny, the judgment of the Connecticut
court migh
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