the Constitution.[150] So far as persons born in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are
concerned, the question was put at rest by the Fourteenth Amendment.
CORPORATIONS
At a comparatively early date the claim was made that a corporation
chartered by a State and consisting of its citizens was entitled to the
benefits of the comity clause in the transaction of business in other
States. It was argued that the Court was bound to look beyond the act of
incorporation and see who were the incorporators. If it found these to
consist solely of citizens of the incorporating State, it was bound to
permit them through the agency of the corporation, to exercise in other
States such privileges and immunities as the citizens thereof enjoyed.
In Bank of Augusta _v._ Earle[151] this view was rejected. The Supreme
Court held that the comity clause was never intended "to give to the
citizens of each State the privileges of citizens in the several
States, and at the same time to exempt them from the liabilities which
the exercise of such privileges would bring upon individuals who were
citizens of the State. This would be to give the citizens of other
States far higher and greater privileges than are enjoyed by the
citizens of the State itself."[152] A similar result was reached in Paul
_v._ Virginia,[153] but by a different course of reasoning. The Court
there held that a corporation--in this instance, an insurance
company--was "the mere creation of local law" and could "have no legal
existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty"[154] which created it;
even recognition of its existence by other States rested exclusively in
their discretion. More recent cases have held that this discretion is
qualified by other provisions of the Constitution, notably the commerce
clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.[155] By reason of its similarity to
the corporate form of organization, a Massachusetts trust has been
denied the protection of this clause.[156]
ALL PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF CITIZENS IN THE SEVERAL STATES
The classical judicial exposition of the meaning of this phrase is that
of Justice Washington in Corfield _v._ Coryell,[157] which was decided
by him on circuit in 1823. The question at issue was the validity of a
New Jersey statute which prohibited "any person who is not, at the time,
an actual inhabitant and resident in this State" from raking or
gathering "clams, oysters or shells" in any of the w
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