at another had remarried, North Carolina, without
calling into question the status of the latter marriage began a new
prosecution for bigamy; and when the defendants appealed the conviction
resulting therefrom, the Supreme Court, in Williams II,[59] sustained
the adjudication of guilt as not denying full faith and credit to the
Nevada divorce decree. Reiterating the doctrine that jurisdiction to
grant divorce is founded on domicile,[60] a majority of the Court held
that a decree of divorce rendered in one State may be collaterally
impeached in another by proof that the court which rendered the decree
lacked jurisdiction (the parties not having been domiciled therein),
even though the record of proceedings in that court purports to show
jurisdiction.[61]
CASES INVOLVING CLAIMS FOR ALIMONY OR PROPERTY ARISING IN FORUM STATE
In Esenwein _v._ Commonwealth,[62] decided on the same day as the second
Williams Case, the Supreme Court also sustained a Pennsylvania court in
its refusal to recognize an _ex parte_ Nevada decree on the ground that
the husband who obtained it never acquired a _bona fide_ domicile in the
latter State. In this instance, the husband and wife had separated in
Pennsylvania, where the wife was granted a support order; and after two
unsuccessful attempts to win a divorce in that State, the husband
departed for Nevada. Upon the receipt of a Nevada decree, the husband
thereafter established a residence in Ohio, and filed an action in
Pennsylvania for total relief from the support order. In a concurring
opinion, in which he was joined by Justices Black and Rutledge, Justice
Douglas stressed the "basic difference between the problem of marital
capacity and the problem of support," and stated that it was "not
apparent that the spouse who obtained the decree can defeat an action
for maintenance or support in another State by showing that he was
domiciled in the State which awarded him the divorce decree," unless the
other spouse appeared or was personally served. "The State where the
deserted wife is domiciled has a deep concern in the welfare of the
family deserted by the head of the household. If he is required to
support his former wife, he is not made a bigamist and the offspring of
his second marriage are not bastardized." Or as succinctly stated by
Justice Rutledge, "the jurisdictional foundation for a decree in one
State capable of foreclosing an action for maintenance or support in
another may be dif
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