their Nevada decrees;
and won the preliminary round of this litigation; that is, Williams
I,[56] when a majority of the justices, overruling Haddock _v._ Haddock,
declared that in this case, the Court must assume that the petitioners
for divorce had a _bona fide_ domicile in Nevada, and not that their
Nevada domicile was a sham. "* * * each State, by virtue of its command
over its domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of
marriage, can alter within its own borders the marriage status of the
spouse domiciled there, even though the other spouse is absent. There is
no constitutional barrier if the form and nature of substituted service
meet the requirements of due process." Accordingly, a decree granted by
Nevada to one, who, it is assumed, is at the time _bona fide_ domiciled
therein, is binding upon the courts of other States, including North
Carolina in which the marriage was performed and where the other party
to the marriage is still domiciled when the divorce was decreed. In view
of its assumptions, which it justified on the basis of an inadequate
record, the Court did not here pass upon the question whether North
Carolina had the power to refuse full faith and credit to a Nevada
decree because it was based on residence rather than domicile; or
because, contrary to the findings of the Nevada court, North Carolina
found that no _bona fide_ domicile had been acquired in Nevada.[57]
Presaging what ruling the Court would make when it did get around to
passing upon the latter question, Justice Jackson, dissenting in
Williams I, protested that "this decision repeals the divorce laws of
all the States and substitutes the law of Nevada as to all marriages one
of the parties to which can afford a short trip there. * * * While a
State can no doubt set up its own standards of domicile as to its
internal concerns, I do not think it can require us to accept and in the
name of the Constitution impose them on other States. * * * The effect
of the Court's decision today--that we must give extraterritorial effect
to any judgment that a state honors for its own purposes--is to deprive
this Court of control over the operation of the full faith and credit
and the due process clauses of the Federal Constitution in cases of
contested jurisdiction and to vest it in the first State to pass on the
facts necessary to jurisdiction."[58]
Notwithstanding that one of the deserted spouses had died since the
initial trial and th
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