, 164 (1944); Follett _v._ McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 575
(1944); Marsh _v._ Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Board of Education _v._
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Thomas _v._ Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945); Saia _v._ New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948). Justice
Frankfurter has criticized the concept of "the preferred position" of
these rights as a phrase that has "uncritically crept into some recent
opinions" of the Court, Kovacs _v._ Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949); and
Justice Jackson in a dissent has also opposed the idea that some
constitutional rights have a preferred position. Brinegar _v._ United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949). "We cannot," he said, "give some
constitutional rights a preferred position without relegating others to
a deferred position; * * *"

[280] Watson _v._ Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Justice Iredell's opinion
in Calder _v._ Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798); Jacobson _v._ Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905). _See also_ Cohen _v._ Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Daniel _v._ Family Security Life Ins. Co.,
336 U.S. 220 (1949); Railway Express Agency _v._ New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949); Wickard _v._ Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States _v._
Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947); American Power & Light Co. _v._ Securities
& Exchange Commission, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
_v._ Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940). _See also_ Railroad Retirement Board
_v._ Alton R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. _v._
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Arizona _v._ California, 283 U.S. 423
(1931); McCray _v._ United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Hamilton _v._
Kentucky Distilleries & W. Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919). Compare, however,
Bailey _v._ Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20
(1922), where the Court considered the motives of the legislation.

[281] 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

[282] 297 U.S. 1 (1936). The majority opinion evoked a protest from
Justice Stone who said in dissenting: "The power of courts to declare
... [an act of Congress unconstitutional] is subject to two guiding
principles of decision which ought never to be absent from judicial
consciousness. One is that courts are concerned only with the power to
enact statutes, not with their wisdom. The other is that while
unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative
branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only
check upon our own exercise of power is our own sen