(1940).

[556] 311 U.S. 169 (1940). This decision has been thoroughly criticized
by Arthur L. Corbin in The Laws of the Several States, 50 Yale L.J. 762
(1941). _See also_ Mitchell Wendell, Relations Between Federal and State
Courts (New York, 1949), 209-223. This book contains a good account of
the operation of the Tyson and Tompkins rules, pp. 113-247.

[557] 333 U.S. 153 (1948). For other cases applying the rule that
decisions of State intermediate courts are binding unless there is
convincing evidence that the State law is otherwise, _see_ Six Companies
of California _v._ Highway Dist., 311 U.S. 180 (1940); Stoner _v._ New
York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940).

[558] Vandenbark _v._ Owens-Illinois Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941).

[559] 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1652; 62 Stat. 944 (1948). In 1938, the year of the
Tompkins decision, the Conformity Act of 1872 (17 Stat. 196 Sec. 5) was
superseded; and from that time until the enactment of 62 Stat. 944, the
federal courts were guided in diversity cases by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure formulated by the Supreme Court by virtue of the
authority delegated it, in 1934, by 48 Stat. 1064.

[560] Ruhlin _v._ New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938).

[561] 326 U.S. 99 (1945).

[562] Ibid. 108-109.

[563] Ibid. 109. Justice Rutledge wrote a dissent in which Justice
Murphy concurred. Justice Rutledge objected to the rigid application of
a statute of limitations to suits in equity and to the implication that
Congress could not authorize federal courts to administer equitable
relief in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties,
notwithstanding State statutes of limitations barring such suits in
State courts. In his view, if any change were to be made, it was for
Congress and not the Court to make it. In line with this ruling _see_
Ragan _v._ Merchants Transfer & W. Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); _also_
Cohen _v._ Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949).

[564] 2 Story, Commentaries, 467 Sec. 1696 (2d. ed., 1851).

[565] An interesting case which reached the Supreme Court under this
clause was Pawlet _v._ Clark, 9 Cr. 292 (1815). In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Story took occasion to assert that grants of land by a
State to a town could not afterwards be repealed so as to divest the
town of its rights under the grant. Ibid. 326; _cf._ Trenton _v._ New
Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).

[566] The Exchange _v._ McFaddon, 7 Cr. 116 (1812); Berizzi