h and the bar using the courtroom for an unseemly
demonstration of garrulous discussion and of ill will and hot tempers. I
therefore agree with Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Frankfurter that
this is the classic case where the trial for contempt should be held
before another judge. I also agree with Mr. Justice Black that
petitioners were entitled by the Constitution to a trial by jury." Ibid.
80.
[46] 330 U.S. 258, 293-307 (1947).
[47] 203 U.S. 563 (1906)
[48] Gompers _v._ Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-443 (1911);
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925). _See also_ Bessette _v._ W.B.
Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 327-328 (1904).
[49] 267 U.S. 87, 119-120 (1925).
[50] Michaelson _v._ United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924).
[51] 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
[52] Penfield Co. _v._ Securities and Exchange Commission, 330 U.S. 585
(1947). Note the dissent of Justice Frankfurter. For delegations of the
subpoena power to administrative agencies and the use of judicial
process to enforce them _see also_ McCrone _v._ United States, 307 U.S.
61 (1939); Endicott Johnson Corp. _v._ Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943);
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. _v._ Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946). In the last
mentioned case Justice Murphy dissented on the ground that delegation of
the subpoena power to nonjudicial officers is unconstitutional as "a
corrosion of liberty." In the Endicott Johnson Case he expressed
dissatisfaction with the exercise of this power by administrative
agencies but confined his dissent to emphasizing greater judicial
scrutiny in enforcing administrative orders to appear and produce
testimony.
[53] 1 Stat. 73, 81.
[54] Ibid. 81-82.
[55] 1 Cr. 137 (1803). _Cf._ Wiscart _v._ Dauchy, 3 Dall. 321 (1796).
[56] McIntire _v._ Wood, 7 Cr. 504 (1813); and McClung _v._ Silliman, 6
Wheat. 598 (1821).
[57] 12 Pet. 524 (1838).
[58] Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cr. 74, 93, 94 (1807).
[59] Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85 (1869).
[60] _See also_ Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (1869).
[61] In United States _v._ Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321,
339 (1906), Justice Brewer, speaking for the Court, approached a theory
of inherent equity jurisdiction when he declared: "The principles of
equity exist independently of and anterior to all Congressional
legislation, and the statutes are either annunciations of those
principles or limitations upon their application in particular cases."
It should be emphasized, however, tha
|