40 (1852).

[233] United Public Workers of America _v._ Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89
(1947). Here, Justice Reed, for the Court, after asserting that
constitutional courts do not render advisory opinions, declared that
"'concrete legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions,'
are requisite" for the adjudication of constitutional issues, citing
Electric Bond and Share Co. _v._ Securities & Exchange Commission, 303
U.S. 419, 443 (1938); United States _v._ Appalachian Electric Power Co.,
311 U.S. 377, 423 (1940); Alabama State Federation of Labor _v._
McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945); and Coffman _v._ Breeze Corporations,
323 U.S. 316, 324 (1945).

[234] 13 How. 40 (1852).

[235] 117 U.S. 697 (1864).

[236] 273 U.S. 70 (1927). In Willing _v._ Chicago Auditorium
Association, 277 U.S. 274 (1928) certain lessees desired to ascertain
their rights under a lease to demolish a building after the lessors had
failed to admit such rights on the allegation that claims, fears, and
uncertainties respecting the rights of the parties greatly impaired the
value of the leasehold. Because there was no showing that the lessors
had hampered the full use of the premises or had committed or threatened
a hostile act, the Supreme Court sustained the decree of the lower Court
dismissing the bill on the ground that the plaintiff was seeking a mere
declaratory judgment. The Court admitted that the proceeding was not
moot, that there were adverse parties with substantial interests, and
that a final judgment could have been rendered, but held, nonetheless,
that the proceeding was not a case or controversy merely because
plaintiffs were thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others.
Ibid. 289-290.

[237] 219 U.S. 346 (1911).

[238] 274 U.S. 123 (1927).

[239] 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933).

[240] 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937).

[241] 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2201, 2202; 48 Stat. 955.

[242] 300 U.S. 227, 240-241 (1937). The Court distinguished between a
justiciable controversy and a dispute of an abstract character,
emphasized that the controversy must be definite and concrete, touching
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, and
reiterated the necessity of "a real and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts."

[243] Ashwander _v._ Tennessee Valley Authority, 2