d been adopted by the Court in Wiscart
_v._ Dauchy, 3 Dall. 321 (1796), and while couched in terms which had
later to be qualified in Cohens _v._ Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 398-402
(1821), by Marshall himself, has remained the doctrine of the Court.
Secondly, there was good ground for Jefferson's criticism, which did not
touch the constitutional features of the decision, but did inveigh
against the temerity of the Court in passing on the merits of a case of
which, by its own admission, it had no jurisdiction.

[268] In this connection Justice Patterson's jury charge in Van Horne's
Lessee _v._ Dorrance, 2 Dall. 304, 308 (1795), is of significance for
its discussion of the relation of the Constitution, the legislature and
the courts. A constitution, he said, "is the form of government,
delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first
principles of fundamental laws are established. The Constitution is
certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is
the supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the power of the
Legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority that
made it." Legislatures are the creatures of the Constitution to which
they owe their existence and powers, and in case of conflict between a
legislative act and the Constitution it is the duty of the courts to
hold it void. In accordance with these doctrines fortified by natural
law concepts, the circuit court invalidated a Pennsylvania statute as
being in conflict with the federal and State Constitutions as a
violation of the inalienable rights of property. In 1799 the federal
circuit court in North Carolina, over which Chief Justice Marshall
presided, invalidated an act of North Carolina as a violation of the
contract clause and the separation of powers in Ogden _v._ Witherspoon,
18 Fed. Cas. No. 10,461 (1802). The reliance on general principles and
natural rights continued in Fletcher _v._ Peck, 6 Cr. 87, 139 (1810)
where the Supreme Court invalidated an act of the Georgia legislature
revoking an earlier land grant as a violation either of the "general
principles which are common to our free institutions," or of the
contract clause.

[269] This phase of judicial review is described by Justice Sutherland
as follows: "From the authority to ascertain and determine the law in a
given case, there necessarily results, in case of conflict, the duty to
declare and enforce the rule of the supreme law and reject