plete remedy" could not be had at
law.[606]

This care for detail in conferring jurisdiction upon the inferior courts
and vesting them with ancillary powers in order to render such
jurisdiction effective is of the utmost significance in the later
development of the law pertaining to Congressional regulation of
jurisdiction, inasmuch as it demonstrates conclusively that a majority
of the members of the first Congress regarded positive action on the
part of Congress to be necessary before jurisdiction and judicial powers
could be exercised by courts of its own creation. Ten years later this
practical construction of article III was accepted by the Supreme Court
in Turner _v._ Bank of North America.[607] The case involved an attempt
to recover on a promissory note in a diversity case contrary to Sec. 11
of the act of 1789 which forbade diversity suits involving assignments
unless the suit was brought before the assignment was made. Counsel for
the bank argued that the circuit courts were not inferior courts and
that the grant of judicial power by the Constitution was a direct grant
of jurisdiction. This argument evoked questions from Chief Justice
Ellsworth and the following statement from Justice Chase: "The notion
has been frequently entertained, that the federal courts derive their
power immediately from the Constitution; but the political truth is,
that the judicial power (except in a few specified instances) belongs to
Congress. If Congress has given the power to this Court, we possess it,
not otherwise; and if Congress has not given the power to us, or to any
other court, it still remains at the legislative disposal. Besides,
Congress is not bound, and it would, perhaps, be inexpedient, to enlarge
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, to every subject, in every
form, which the Constitution might warrant."[608] The Court applied Sec.
11 of the Judiciary Act and ruled that the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction.

Eight years later Chief Justice Marshall in distinguishing between
common law and statutory courts declared that "courts which are created
by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot
transcend that jurisdiction."[609] This rule was reaffirmed in the
famous case of United States _v._ Hudson and Goodwin[610] on the
assumption that the power of Congress to create inferior courts
necessarily implies "the power to limit the jurisdiction of those Courts
to particular objects."[611] Af