can confederacy" and ruled that a citizen of the District of
Columbia could not sue a citizen of Virginia on the basis of diversity
of citizenship. In the course of his brief opinion Marshall owned that
it was "extraordinary that the courts of the United States, which are
open to aliens, and to the citizens of every State in the union should
be closed" to the residents of the District, but the situation, he
indicated, was "a subject for legislative, not for judicial
consideration."[508] The same restrictive rule was later extended to
citizens of territories of the United States.[509]

Extension of Jurisdiction by the Act of 1940

Whether Chief Justice Marshall had in mind a constitutional amendment or
an act of Congress when he spoke of legislative consideration is not
clear. At any rate, not until 1940 did Congress enact a statute to
confer on federal district courts jurisdiction of civil actions
(involving no federal question) "between citizens of different States,
or citizens of the District of Columbia, the Territory of Hawaii, or
Alaska and any State or Territory."[510] In National Mutual Insurance
Co. _v._ Tidewater Transfer Co.,[511] this act was sustained by five
judges, but for widely different reasons. Justice Jackson, in an opinion
in which Justices Black and Burton joined, was for adhering to the rule
that the District of Columbia is not a State, but held the act to be
valid nevertheless because of the exclusive and plenary power of
Congress to legislate for the District and its broad powers under the
necessary and proper clause.[512] Justice Rutledge, in a concurring
opinion, in which Justice Murphy joined, agreed that the act was valid
and asserted that the Ellzey case should be overruled.[513] Chief
Justice Vinson in a dissent in which Justice Douglas concurred[514] and
Justice Frankfurter in a dissent in which Justice Reed joined[515]
thought the act invalid and would have adhered to the rule in the Ellzey
case. The net result is that the Ellzey case still stands insofar as it
holds that the District of Columbia is not a State, but that under
Congressional enactment citizens of the District may now sue citizens of
States in the absence of a federal question, on the basis of no statable
constitutional principle, but through the grace of what Justice
Frankfurter called "conflicting minorities in combination."[516]

CITIZENSHIP, NATURAL PERSONS

For purposes of diversity jurisdiction State citizenshi