ce of one who has availed himself of the benefit of a statute
or who fails to show he is injured by its operation; nor if a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be fairly avoided.[273] Speaking of the policy of avoiding the decision
of constitutional issues except when necessary Justice Rutledge,
speaking for the Court, declared in 1947: "The policy's ultimate
foundations, some if not all of which also sustain the jurisdictional
limitation, lie in all that goes to make up the unique place and
character, in our scheme, of judicial review of governmental action for
constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that function,
particularly in view of possible consequences for others stemming also
from constitutional roots; the comparative finality of those
consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other
repositories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their
authority; the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally,
for each to keep within its power, including the courts; the inherent
limitations of the judicial process, arising especially from its largely
negative character and limited resources of enforcement; withal in the
paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our system."[274]

The Doctrine of Political Questions

A third limitation to the exercise of judicial review is the rule,
partly inherent in the judicial process, but also partly a precautionary
rule adopted by the Court in order to avoid clashes with the "political
branches," is that the federal courts will not decide "political
questions."[275]

The "Reasonable Doubt" Doctrine

A fourth rule, of a precautionary nature, is that no act of legislation
will be declared void except in a very clear case, or unless the act is
unconstitutional beyond all reasonable doubt.[276] Sometimes this rule
is expressed in another way, in the formula that an act of Congress or a
State legislature is presumed to be constitutional until proved
otherwise "beyond all reasonable doubt."[277] In operation this rule is
subject to two limitations which seriously impair its efficacy. The
first is that the doubts which are effective are the doubts of the
majority only. If five Justices of learning and attachment to the
Constitution are convinced that the statute is invalid and four others
of equal learning and attachment to the Constitution are convinced that
it is valid or are uncertai