s in which
an essential element is a final and binding judgment on the parties. As
stated by Justice Jackson, when the Court refused to review an order of
the Civil Aeronautics Board, which in effect was a mere recommendation
to the President for his final action, "To revise or review an
administrative decision which has only the force of a recommendation to
the President would be to render an advisory opinion in its most
obnoxious form--advice that the President has not asked, tendered at the
demand of a private litigant, on a subject concededly within the
President's exclusive, ultimate control. This Court early and wisely
determined that it would not give advisory opinions even when asked by
the Chief Executive. It has also been the firm and unvarying practice of
Constitutional Courts to render no judgments not binding and conclusive
on the parties and none that are subject to later review or alteration
by administrative action."[230] The early refusal of the Court to render
advisory opinions has discouraged direct requests for advice so that the
advisory opinion has appeared only collaterally in cases where there was
a lack of adverse parties,[231] or where the judgment of the Court was
subject to later review or action by the executive or legislative
branches of government,[232] or where the issues involved were abstract
or contingent.[233]
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
The rigid emphasis placed upon such elements of the judicial power as
finality of judgment and an award of execution in United States _v._
Ferreira,[234] Gordon _v._ United States[235], and Liberty Warehouse
_v._ Grannis,[236] coupled with the equally rigid emphasis upon adverse
parties and real interests as essential elements of a case or
controversy in Muskrat _v._ United States,[237] created serious doubts
concerning the validity of a proposed federal declaratory judgment act.
These were dispelled to some extent by Fidelity National Bank _v._
Swope,[238] which held that an award of execution is not an essential
part of every judgment and contained general statements in opposition to
the principles of the Grannis and Willing cases. Then in 1933 the
Supreme Court entertained an appeal from a declaratory judgment rendered
by the Tennessee Courts in Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. _v._
Wallace,[239] and in doing so declared that the Constitution does not
require that a case or controversy be presented by traditional forms of
procedure, involving only trad
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