attack on the
political expediency of the Hatch Act.[187]

From the rule that courts will not render advisory opinions or write
essays in political theory on speculative issues, it follows logically
that they will not determine moot cases or suits arranged by collusion
between parties who have no opposing interests. A moot case has been
defined as "one which seeks to get a judgment on a pretended
controversy, when in reality there is none, or a decision in advance
about a right before it has been actually asserted and contested, or a
judgment upon some matter which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot
have any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy."[188]
Cases may become moot because of a change in the law, or the status of
the litigants, or because of some act of the parties which dissolves the
controversy.[189] Just as courts will not speculate an hypothetical
question, so they will not analyze dead issues.[190] The duty of every
federal court, said Justice Gray, "is to decide actual controversies by
a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not give opinions upon
moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the matter at issue in the case before
it."[191]

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

The rule has been long established that the courts have no general
supervisory power over the executive or administrative branches of
government.[192] In Decatur _v._ Paulding,[193] which involved an
attempt by mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Navy to pay a
pension, the Supreme Court in sustaining denial of relief stated: "The
interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties
of the executive departments of the government, would be productive of
nothing but mischief; and we are quite satisfied, that such a power was
never intended to be given to them."[194] It follows, therefore, that
mandamus will lie against an executive official only to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty which admits of no discretion as
contrasted with executive or political duties which admit of
discretion.[195] It follows, too, that an injunction will not lie
against the President,[196] or against the head of an executive
department to control the exercise of executive discretion.[197] These
principles are well illustrated by Georgia _v._ Stanton,[198]
Mississippi _v._ Johnson,[199] and Kendall _v._ United States ex rel.
Stokes.[200]

Origin