courts
of appeal. The Chief Justice was authorized to designate one of the
judges as chief judge, to designate additional judges from time to time,
and to revoke designations. The chief judge in turn was authorized to
divide the Court into divisions of three or more members each, with any
such division empowered to render judgment as the judgment of the
Court. The Court was vested with jurisdiction and powers of a district
court to hear appeals filed within thirty days against denials of
protests by the Price Administrator and with exclusive jurisdiction to
set aside regulations, orders, or price schedules, in whole or in part,
or to remand the proceeding. But no regulation or price schedule could
be set aside or enjoined unless the Court was satisfied that it was
contrary to law or was arbitrary or capricious. Even then the
effectiveness of a restraining order was to be suspended for thirty days
and, if appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days, until its
final disposition. Although the act deprived the district courts of the
power to enjoin the enforcement of orders and price schedules, it vested
them with jurisdiction to enforce the act and orders issued thereunder
in actions brought by the Administrator to enjoin violations and to try
criminal prosecutions brought by the Attorney General. Since the
Emergency Court of Appeals, subject to review by the Supreme Court, was
given exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any order
issued under the act, it resulted that the district courts were deprived
of the power to inquire into the validity of orders involved in civil or
criminal proceedings in which they had jurisdiction.[110]
Judicial Review Restrained
In Yakus _v._ United States[111] the Court held in an opinion by Chief
Justice Stone that there is "no principle of law or provision of the
Constitution which precludes Congress from making criminal the violation
of an administrative regulation, by one who has failed to avail himself
of an adequate separate procedure for the adjudication of its validity,
or which precludes the practice, in many ways desirable, of splitting
the trial for violations of an administrative regulation by committing
the determination of the issue of its validity to the agency which
created it, and the issue of violation to a court which is given
jurisdiction to punish violations. Such a requirement presents no novel
constitutional issue."[112] In a dissent Justice Rutle
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