FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   636   637   638   639   640   641   642   643   644   645   646   647   648   649   650   651   652   653   654   655   656   657   658   659   660  
661   662   663   664   665   666   667   668   669   670   671   672   673   674   675   676   677   678   679   680   681   682   683   684   685   >>   >|  
courts of appeal. The Chief Justice was authorized to designate one of the judges as chief judge, to designate additional judges from time to time, and to revoke designations. The chief judge in turn was authorized to divide the Court into divisions of three or more members each, with any such division empowered to render judgment as the judgment of the Court. The Court was vested with jurisdiction and powers of a district court to hear appeals filed within thirty days against denials of protests by the Price Administrator and with exclusive jurisdiction to set aside regulations, orders, or price schedules, in whole or in part, or to remand the proceeding. But no regulation or price schedule could be set aside or enjoined unless the Court was satisfied that it was contrary to law or was arbitrary or capricious. Even then the effectiveness of a restraining order was to be suspended for thirty days and, if appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days, until its final disposition. Although the act deprived the district courts of the power to enjoin the enforcement of orders and price schedules, it vested them with jurisdiction to enforce the act and orders issued thereunder in actions brought by the Administrator to enjoin violations and to try criminal prosecutions brought by the Attorney General. Since the Emergency Court of Appeals, subject to review by the Supreme Court, was given exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any order issued under the act, it resulted that the district courts were deprived of the power to inquire into the validity of orders involved in civil or criminal proceedings in which they had jurisdiction.[110] Judicial Review Restrained In Yakus _v._ United States[111] the Court held in an opinion by Chief Justice Stone that there is "no principle of law or provision of the Constitution which precludes Congress from making criminal the violation of an administrative regulation, by one who has failed to avail himself of an adequate separate procedure for the adjudication of its validity, or which precludes the practice, in many ways desirable, of splitting the trial for violations of an administrative regulation by committing the determination of the issue of its validity to the agency which created it, and the issue of violation to a court which is given jurisdiction to punish violations. Such a requirement presents no novel constitutional issue."[112] In a dissent Justice Rutle
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   636   637   638   639   640   641   642   643   644   645   646   647   648   649   650   651   652   653   654   655   656   657   658   659   660  
661   662   663   664   665   666   667   668   669   670   671   672   673   674   675   676   677   678   679   680   681   682   683   684   685   >>   >|  



Top keywords:
jurisdiction
 

orders

 

validity

 

district

 

violations

 

criminal

 
Justice
 

thirty

 

courts

 

regulation


Administrator
 

exclusive

 

schedules

 
enjoin
 
issued
 
brought
 

deprived

 
Supreme
 

violation

 

precludes


administrative

 

judges

 

designate

 

authorized

 

judgment

 
vested
 

dissent

 
States
 

United

 

resulted


inquire

 

proceedings

 

Restrained

 

Review

 
involved
 

Judicial

 
opinion
 

failed

 

committing

 

splitting


adequate

 

procedure

 

adjudication

 
separate
 

desirable

 
determination
 
agency
 

principle

 
practice
 
presents