he facts of the
case were as follows: On receiving the verdict of conviction of the
defendants, trial Judge Medina at once issued a certificate under Rule
42 (a) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, finding counsel guilty of
criminal contempt and imposing various jail terms up to six months. The
immediate question raised was whether the contempt charged was one which
the judge was authorized to determine for himself, or one which under
Rule 42 (b) could only be passed upon by another judge and after notice
and hearing; but behind this issue loomed the same constitutional issue
which was dealt with by the Court in the Cooke case, of the requirements
of due process of law. The Court sustained the Circuit Court of Appeals
in affirming the convictions and sentences, at the same time, however,
reversing some of Judge Medina's specifications of contempt, one of
these being the charge that the petitioners entered into an agreement
deliberately to "impair my health." "We hold," said Justice Jackson,
speaking for the majority, "that Rule 42 allows the trial judge, upon
the occurrence in his presence of a contempt, immediately and summarily
to punish it, if, in his opinion, delay will prejudice the trial. We
hold, on the other hand, that if he believes the exigencies of the trial
require that he defer judgment until its completion he may do so without
extinguishing his power. * * * We are not unaware or unconcerned that
persons identified with unpopular causes may find it difficult to enlist
the counsel of their choice. But we think it must be ascribed to causes
quite apart from fear of being held in contempt, for we think few
effective lawyers would regard the tactics condemned here as either
necessary or helpful to a successful defense. That such clients seem to
have thought these tactics necessary is likely to contribute to the
bar's reluctance to appear for them rather more than fear of contempt.
But that there may be no misunderstanding, we make clear that this
Court, if its aid be needed, will unhesitatingly protect counsel in
fearless, vigorous and effective performance of every duty pertaining to
the office of the advocate on behalf of any person whatsoever. But it
will not equate contempt with courage or insults with independence. It
will also protect the processes of orderly trial, which is the supreme
object of the lawyer's calling."[45]
Contempt by Disobedience of Orders
Disobedience of injunction orders, part
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