leading case of Interstate Commerce
Commission _v._ Brimson,[51] where it was held that the contempt power
of the courts might by statutory authorization be utilized in aid of the
Interstate Commerce Commission in enforcing compliance with its orders.
In 1947 a proceeding to enforce a _subpoena duces tecum_ issued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission during the Course of an investigation
was ruled to be civil in character on the ground that the only sanction
was a penalty designed to compel obedience. The Court then enunciated
the principle that where a fine or imprisonment imposed on the contemnor
is designed to coerce him to do what he has refused to do, the
proceeding is one for civil contempt.[52]

POWER TO ISSUE WRITS; THE ACT OF 1789

From the beginning of government under the Constitution of 1789 Congress
has assumed under the necessary and proper clause, its power to
establish inferior courts, its power to regulate the jurisdiction of
federal courts and the power to regulate the issuance of writs. The
Thirteenth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the circuit
courts to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts, and the
Supreme Court to issue such writs to the circuit courts. The Supreme
Court was also empowered to issue writs of mandamus "in cases warranted
by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons
holding office, under the authority of the United States."[53] Section
14 provided that all courts of the United States should "have power to
issue writs of _scire facias_, _habeas corpus_, and all other writs not
specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the
exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the
principles and usages of law."[54] Issuance of the writ of _habeas
corpus_ was limited in that it was to extend only to persons in custody
under or by color of authority of the United States. Although the act of
1789 left the power over writs subject largely to the common law, it is
significant as a reflection of the belief, in which the courts have on
the whole concurred, that an act of Congress is necessary to confer
judicial power to issue writs.

Common Law Powers of the District of Columbia Courts

That portion of section 13 which authorized the Supreme Court to issue
writs of mandamus in the exercise of its original jurisdiction was held
invalid in Marbury _v._ Madison,[55] as an unconstitutional enlargement
o