f the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. After two more futile
efforts to obtain a writ of mandamus, in cases in which the Court found
that power to issue the writ had not been vested by statute in the
courts of the United States except in aid of already existing
jurisdiction,[56] a litigant was successful in Kendall _v._ United
States ex rel. Stokes[57] in finding a court which would take
jurisdiction in a mandamus proceeding. This was the circuit court of the
United States for the District of Columbia which was held to have
jurisdiction, on the theory that the common law, in force in Maryland
when the cession of that part of the State which became the District of
Columbia was made to the United States, remained in force in the
District. At an early time, therefore, the federal courts established
the rule that mandamus can be issued only when authorized by a
constitutional statute and within the limits imposed by the common law
and the separation of powers.
Habeas Corpus
Although the writ of _habeas corpus_ has something of a special status
by virtue of article I, section 9, paragraph 2, the power of a specific
court to issue the writ has long been held to have its authorization
only in written law.[58] In Ex parte Yerger,[59] where the petitioner
was held in custody by the military authorities under the Reconstruction
Acts, the Court, referring to the prohibition against the suspension of
the writ of _habeas corpus_, clearly indicated that Congress is not
bound to provide for the protection of federal rights by investing the
federal courts with jurisdiction to protect them. Furthermore, the case
also incorporates the rule that power to issue the writ may be withdrawn
even in pending cases.[60] The rules pertaining to mandamus and _habeas
corpus_ are applicable to the other common law and statutory writs, the
power to issue which, though judicial in nature, must be derived from
the statutes and cannot go beyond them.
Congress Limits the Inquisition Power
Although the speculations of some publicists and some judicial dicta[61]
support the idea of an inherent power of the federal courts sitting in
equity to issue injunctions independently of statutory limitations,
neither the course taken by Congress nor the specific rulings of the
Supreme Court support any such principle. Congress has repeatedly
exercised its power to limit the use of the injunction in the federal
courts. The first limitation on the equi
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