ss, but in the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, as shown by the concurrence of two-thirds of that body."
Ibid. 4470-4471. The veto would seem to have been based on a quibble.
[188] 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
[189] Ibid. 473-476.
[190] Clark _v._ Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
[191] Charlton _v._ Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
[192] Fed. Cas. No. 13,799 (1855).
[193] 2 Pet. 253, 309 (1829).
[194] Acts of March 2, 1829 and of February 24, 1855; 4 Stat. 359 and 10
Stat. 614.
[195] In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), where the treaty provisions
involved are given. The supplementary legislation was later reenacted as
Rev. Stat. Sec. 4083-4091.
[196] 18 U.S.C.A. Sec. 3181-3195.
[197] Baldwin _v._ Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 683 (1887).
[198] Neely _v._ Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901). A different theory is
offered by Justice Story in his opinion for the Court in Prigg _v._
Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 539 (1842), in the following words: "Treaties made
between the United States and foreign powers, often contain special
provisions, which do not execute themselves, but require the
interposition of Congress to carry them into effect, and Congress has
constantly, in such cases, legislated on the subject; yet, although the
power is given to the executive, with the consent of the senate, to make
treaties, the power is nowhere in positive terms conferred upon Congress
to make laws to carry the stipulations of treaties into effect. It has
been supposed to result from the duty of the national government to
fulfil all the obligations of treaties." Ibid. 619. Story was here in
quest of arguments to prove that Congress had power to enact a fugitive
slave law, which he based on its power "to carry into effect rights
expressly given and duties expressly enjoined" by the Constitution.
Ibid. 618-619. But the treaty-making power is neither a right nor a
duty, but one of the powers "vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States." Article I, section 8, clause 18.
[199] Geofroy _v._ Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890). _See also_ Fort
Leavenworth Railroad Co. _v._ Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 541 (1885), which is
cited in the Field opinion in support of the idea that no cession of any
portion of a State's territory could be effected without the State's
consent. The statement is the purest obiter.
[200] Ibid. 267.
[201] The majority of the cases, as was pointed out earlier, dealt with
the competence of the treat
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