the war itself, the constitutional basis should be scrutinized with
care." Ibid. 146-147.

[374] 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 453, 464-465 (1855).

[375] 9 Stat. 102 (1846); 20 U.S.C. Sec. 41 and 48.

[376] _Cf._ 2 Stat. 78. The provision has long since dropped out of the
statute book.

[377] Runkle _v._ United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887).

[378] _Cf._ In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 670-671 (1897), where it is
held that presumptions in favor of official action "preclude collateral
attack on the sentences of courts-martial." _See also_ United States
_v._ Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1893); and Bishop _v._ United States,
197 U.S. 334, 341-342 (1905); both of which in effect repudiate Runkle
_v._ United States.

[379] "The President, in the exercise of his executive powers under the
Constitution, may act through the head of the appropriate executive
department. The heads of departments are his authorized assistants in
the performance of his executive duties, and their official acts,
promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively his
acts." Wilcox _v._ Jackson ex dem McConnel, 13 Pet. 498, 513 (1839).
_See also_, United States _v._ Eliason, 16 Pet. 291 (1842); Williams
_v._ United States, 1 How. 290, 297 (1843); United States _v._ Jones, 18
How. 92, 95 (1856); United States _v._ Clarke (Confiscation Cases), 20
Wall. 92 (1874); United States _v._ Farden, 99 U.S. 10 (1879); Wolsey
_v._ Chapman, 101 U.S. 755 (1880).

[380] 1 How. 290 (1843).

[381] 3 Stat. 723 (1823).

[382] 1 How. at 297-298.

[383] "It is manifestly impossible for the President to execute every
duty, and every detail thereof, imposed upon him by the Congress. The
courts have recognized this and have further recognized that he usually
and properly acts through the several executive departments. Every
reasonable presumption of validity is to be indulged with respect to the
performance by the head of a department of a duty imposed upon the
President and executed by the department head ostensibly in behalf of
the President. Nevertheless, the authorities indicate that the President
cannot, without statutory authority, delegate a discretionary duty,
relieving himself of all responsibility, so that the duty when performed
will not be his act but wholly the act of another. Williams _v._ United
States, 1 How. 290, 297 (1843); Runkle _v._ United States, 122 U.S. 543,
557 (1887); United States _v._ Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84, 88 (1893); French
_v._ Weeks,