Farrand, II, 183.
[144] Ibid. 538-539.
[145] The Federalist No. 64.
[146] Farrand, III, 424.
[147] Washington sought to use the Senate as a council, but the effort
proved futile, principally because the Senate balked. For the details
_see_ Corwin, The President, Office and Powers (3d ed.), 253-257.
[148] United States _v._ Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936).
[149] Corwin, The President, Office and Powers (3d ed.), 467-468.
[150] "Obviously the treaty must contain the whole contract between the
parties, and the power of the Senate is limited to a ratification of
such terms as have already been agreed upon between the President,
acting for the United States, and the commissioners of the other
contracting power. The Senate has no right to ratify the treaty and
introduce new terms into it, which shall be obligatory upon the other
power, although it may refuse its ratification, or make such
ratifications conditional upon the adoption of amendments to the
treaty." Fourteen Diamond Rings _v._ United States, 183 U.S. 176, 183
(1901).
[151] _Cf._ Article I, section 5, clause 1; _also_ Missouri Pacific R.
Co. _v._ Kansas, 248 U.S. 276, 283-284 (1919).
[152] _See_ Samuel Crandall, Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement (2d
ed., Washington, 1916), Sec. 53, for instances.
[153] Foster _v._ Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (1829). "Though several
writers on the subject of government place that [the treaty-making]
power in the class of executive authorities, yet this is evidently an
arbitrary disposition; for if we attend carefully to its operation, it
will be found to partake more of the legislative than of the executive
character, though it does not seem strictly to fall within the
definition of either. The essence of the legislative authority is to
enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of
the society; while the execution of the laws, and the employment of the
common strength, either for this purpose, or for the common defence,
seem to comprise all the functions of the executive magistrate. The
power of making treaties is, plainly, neither the one nor the other. It
relates neither to the execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the
enaction of new ones; and still less to an exertion of the common
strength. Its objects are _contracts_ with foreign nations, which have
the force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They
are not rules prescribed by th
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