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of such interference will be clearly seen upon consideration of its possible consequences. Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the court and refuses to execute the acts of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur between the executive and legislative departments of the government? May not the House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal? And in that case could this court interfere, in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United States from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would [not?] the strange spectacle be offered to the public world of an attempt by this court to arrest proceedings in that court?"[469] The Court further indicated that the same principle would apply to an application for a mandamus ordering the President to exercise any of his powers. THE PRESIDENT'S SUBORDINATES AND THE COURTS But while the courts are unable to compel the President to act or to keep him from acting, yet his acts, when performed are in proper cases subject to judicial review and disallowance.[470] Moreover, the subordinates through whom he acts may always be prohibited by writ of injunction from doing a threatened illegal act which might lead to irreparable damage,[471] or be compelled by writ of mandamus to perform a duty definitely required by law,[472] such suits being usually brought in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.[473] Also, by common law principles, a subordinate executive officer is personally liable under the ordinary law for any act done in excess of authority.[474] Indeed, by a recent holding, district courts of the United States are bound to entertain suits for damages arising out of alleged violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights, even though as the law now stands the Court is powerless to award damages.[475] But Congress may, in certain cases, exonerate the officer by a so-called act of indemnity,[476] while as the law stands at present, any officer of the United States who is charged with a crime under the laws of a State for an act done under the authority of the United States is entitled to have his case transferred to the national courts.[477] Section
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