the crossing of Duck River above Columbia,
and driven our cavalry back; and, about two o'clock that night,
that prisoners reported the enemy laying pontoon bridges, and that
Hood's infantry would begin to cross that morning. The army was
ready to march at a moment's notice. It could have retired to
Spring Hill or to Franklin without molestation or delay, but that
would have given the enemy the crossing of Duck River at Columbia
and the turnpike road for his advance with his artillery and trains.
There was no assurance that Thomas had assembled any of his expected
reinforcements at Nashville or elsewhere. It was known that orders
had been given some days before looking to concentration of some
of the troops in his department somewhere, but what had been
accomplished I was not informed. About A. J. Smith I was in a like
state of uncertainty. Only one thing was clear, and that was that
I must hold Hood back, if possible, until informed that Thomas had
concentrated his troops; for if I failed in that, Hood would not
only force me back upon Nashville before Thomas was ready to meet
him there, but would get possession of the Chattanooga Railroad,
and thus cut off the troops coming to Nashville from that direction.
After considering the matter some time in the night, I decided to
hold on at least until morning. Early in the morning a brigade of
infantry was sent up the river to reconnoiter and watch the enemy's
movements; at the same time Stanley was ordered, with two divisions
of his corps, back to Spring Hill, to occupy and intrench a position
there covering the roads and the trains, which were ordered to be
parked at that place, and General Thomas H. Ruger was ordered to
join him.

IMPORTANCE OF GAINING TIME FOR THOMAS

About 8 A. M. on the 29th came a despatch from Thomas, dated 8 P. M.
of the day before, conveying the information that Smith had not
arrived, and saying nothing about any other reinforcements, but
expressing the wish that the Duck River position be held until
Smith arrived; and another despatch designating Franklin, behind
the Harpeth River, as the place to which I would have to retire if
it became necessary to fall back from Duck River. I then decided
to hold on to the crossing of Duck River until the night of the
29th, thus gaining twenty-four hours more for Thomas to concentrate
his troops. I did not apprehend any serious danger at Spring Hill;
for Hood's i