l A. J. Smith's three divisions, which had been ordered
from Missouri to join the forces of General Thomas. In his entire
department, excluding the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps in the
field, the infantry and artillery force, present for duty equipped,
officers and men, November 20, 1864, amounted to 29,332; the two
corps in the field, to 24,265; and A. J. Smith's corps, to about
10,000. The entire cavalry force, mounted and equipped, was about
4800; that unmounted, about 6700.

THE CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL THOMAS

It is necessary to exclude from this statement of troops available
for service in middle Tennessee those in Kentucky and East Tennessee,
belonging to the Department of the Ohio, for the reason that just
at that time unusual demand was made upon those troops for service
in East Tennessee, where some of the State forces had met with
disaster. This probably accounts in part for the discrepancies in
General Sherman's estimates referred to later.

Hood's forces were then understood by General Thomas to consist of
from 40,000 to 45,000 infantry and artillery, and 10,000 to 12,000
cavalry, including Forrest's command. I find from General Sherman's
despatch to Thomas, dated October 19, that his estimate of Hood's
strength, October 19, 1864, was about 40,000 men of all arms.

I do not find in General Thomas's report or despatches any exact
statement of his own estimate; but the following language in his
official report of January 20, 1865, seems quite sufficiently
explicit on that point: "Two divisions of infantry, under Major-
General A. J. Smith, were reported on their way to join me from
Missouri, which, with several one-year regiments then arriving in
the department, and detachments collected from points of minor
importance, would swell my command, when concentrated, to an army
nearly as large as that of the enemy. Had the enemy delayed his
advance a week or ten days longer, I would have been ready to meet
him at some point south of Duck River. . . . "

This must of course be accepted as General Thomas's own estimate
of the enemy's strength, on which his own action was based. And
it should be remembered that military operations must be based upon
the information then in possession of the commander, and just
criticism must also be based upon his action upon that information,
and not upon any afterward obtained.

General Sherman estimated the force left with Thom