t the light in which the part acted by Opdycke's
brigade (the others not being mentioned) is presented by some
"historians," to the prejudice, relatively, of other portions of
the army and of their commanders, is essentially false. It is
represented as something purely spontaneous, out of the ordinary
course, not contemplated in the dispositions made for battle,
unforseen and unexpected; in short, something more--yes, vastly
more--than the reasonable duty of the brigade; or, "beyond all
power of generalship to mold the battle or control its issue, the
simple charge of Opdycke's brigade stands in boldest relief." The
same might be said with equal truth of the action of any brigade
upon which devolves the assault of defense of the key of a military
position. The success or failure of "generalship to mold the battle
or control its issue" depends absolutely upon the action of such
brigades, their doing, or failure to do, the duty belonging to the
position to which they are assigned. Every soldier in the army
knew what his duty was in such a case--knew for what he had been
placed in that position. It would have been strange indeed if the
gallant commander of that brigade had waited for orders from some
higher officer to move "forward to the lines." As well might the
commander of a brigade in line wait for orders from the general-in-
chief before commencing to fire on the advancing enemy.

The highest tribute that can be paid to Opdycke's brigade is the
just and true one, that it did exactly the duty assigned it in the
plan of battle, and did that duty nobly and with complete success.
That other brigades did the same is sufficiently shown by the fact
that twenty battle-flags were captured by a single brigade of the
Twenty-third Corps on the same part of the line, and that the 12th
and 16th Kentucky regiments relatively suffered equally heavy losses
in killed and wounded with those of Opdycke.( 2)

SERIOUS ERROR OF TWO BRIGADES

As before stated, the dispositions for defense contemplated the
whole of Wagner's division as the reserve to support the center,
that being the only part of the line upon which the enemy would
have time to make a heavy assault that day. This provision for an
ample reserve had been made after full consideration and before
Wood's division was ordered to the north side of the river, which
was after the day was well advanced and the enemy's cavalry ha