y which
the non-military agencies of government interfere with the operations
of armies. The War Department telegraph corps alone was intrusted
with the cipher in which General Thomas and I could communicate
with each other by telegraph. Neither he, nor I, nor any of our
staff officers were permitted to know the telegraph code. The work
was so badly done that from eight to forty-eight hours were occupied
in sending and delivering a despatch. Finally the cipher-operator
attached to my headquarters in the field deserted his post and went
to Franklin, so that the time required for a messenger to ride from
Franklin to my position in the field was added to the delay caused
by deciphering despatches. From all this it resulted that my
superior at Nashville was able to give me little assistance during
the critical days of that campaign. It has been generally supposed
that I was all that time acting under orders or instructions from
General Thomas, and his numerous despatches have been quoted in
"histories" as evidence in support of that supposition. The fact
is that I was not only without any appropriate orders or instructions
nearly all the time, but also without any timely information from
General Thomas to guide my action.

This fact appears to have been fully recognized by General Thomas
in his official report, wherein he made no mention of any orders
or instructions given by him during the progress of those operations,
but referred only to "instructions already given" before I went to
Pulaski, and said: "My plans and wishes were fully explained to
General Schofield, and, as subsequent events will show, properly
appreciated and executed by him."( 3)

[( 1) War Records, Vol. XLV.]

[( 2) War Records, Vol. XLV, part I, p. 944.]

[( 3) War Records, Vol. XXXIX, part I, p. 590.]

CHAPTER X
Hood Forces the Crossing of Duck River--Importance of Gaining Time
for Thomas to Concentrate Reinforcements at Nashville--The Affair
at Spring Hill--Incidents of the Night Retreat--Thomas's Reply to
the Request that a Bridge be Laid over the Harpeth--The Necessity
of Standing Ground at Franklin--Hood's Formidable Attack--Serious
Error of Two Brigades of the Rear-Guard--Brilliant Services of the
Reserve--Yellow Fever Averted--Hood's Assaults Repulsed--Johnston's
Criticism of Hood--The Advantage of Continuing the Retreat to
Nashville.

In the afternoon of November 28 I received information that the
enemy's cavalry had forced