sed at Columbia to Franklin
to lay a bridge there."( 1) General Thomas or his staff should
have known that it was utterly impossible for me to use the pontoons
which I had at Columbia. Those pontoons were heavy wooden bateaux,
and there were no wagons to transport them, the train that brought
them there having been taken away, it is presumed by his order,
certainly not by mine. Hence I was compelled to burn that pontoon
bridge as well as the railroad bridge (partially) when my troops
retreated from Ducktown. But even if this were not all true, Thomas
knew the enemy was already crossing Duck River on my flank, and
that I must speedily take up a new position behind the Harpeth,
and that I desired him to provide the means for my army to cross
that river. It was a reasonable inference that I should not have
asked him to send another bridge if I already had one that I could
use. Besides, I was commanding General Thomas's army, operating
in his department, wherein I had no control of anything in rear of
the troops under my charge. It was his duty to foresee and provide
for all the necessities that might arise in the rear of the army
in the field. I telegraphed him again for a bridge at the Harpeth
on the 29th, when I found that retreat was inevitable, but he
apparently did not get that despatch. He nevertheless sent bridge
material by rail to Franklin, where it arrived on the morning of
November 30, too late for the pontoons to be used, though the
flooring was useful in covering the railroad bridge and the burned
wagon-bridge. I found also on the south side of the river a very
large park of wagons belonging to the Department of the Cumberland,
which, as well as my own trains and artillery, must be crossed over
before I could withdraw my troops to the north side. The troops
were very much fatigued by their long night march, rendering
considerable rest indispensable. Hence there could not be much
time in which to prepare defensive works with such obstructions as
to insure successful defense against a very heavy assault. But,
much more serious, Hood might cross the river above Franklin with
a considerable force of infantry, as well as with all his cavalry,
before I could get my materials over and troops enough to meet him
on the north side. The situation at Franklin had become vastly
more serious than that at Columbia or Spring Hill, and solely
because of the neglect of so simple a thing as to provide the bridge
I