n., but met, October 13, the head
of Hood's column at Dalton, where several trains of cars with
supplies and men without arms returning from furlough on their way
to Sherman had been stopped by the reported approach of Hood. I
ordered all back to Cleveland, and we barely had time to escape
capture by Hood's cavalry. On arriving at Cleveland, I reported
by telegraph to General Thomas, then at Nashville; and he desired
me to go to Chattanooga, take command of the troops there, and
prepare to defend that place, which it was thought Hood might
attempt to take by a _coup de main_, or to co-operate with Sherman.
As General Sherman says (Vol. II, page 156), "Hood had broken up
the telegraph, and thus had prevented quick communication"; but
through my own scouts and spies I was able to keep track of Hood's
movements. As soon as he turned westward I determined to move with
the troops, when no longer necessary to the defense of Chattanooga,
rapidly to Trenton and Valley Head, seize the passes through the
Lookout range, and prevent Hood's escape in that direction, presuming
that Sherman would intercept his retreat down the Chattanooga
valley. I sent a courier to General Sherman informing him of my
purpose, and informed General Thomas by telegraph. But the latter
disapproved my plan, and directed me to move to defend Caperton's
Ferry. This is what General Sherman refers to in his despatch of
October 16: "Your first move on Trenton and Valley Head was right;
the move to defend Caperton's Ferry is wrong. Notify General Thomas
of these, my views." But the difference between right and wrong
proved immaterial, since Hood was left free to escape down the
Chattanooga valley. Why this was done, or why Sherman did not want
to force the enemy east, by Spring Place, into the barren mountains,
where Johnston would have been compelled to go if McPherson's move
on Resaca in May had been successful, seems a mystery. The
explanation is probably to be found in Sherman's wish that Hood
would go where he would not be compelled to follow, and thus would
leave him (Sherman) a clear road for his march to the sea. Indeed
the conviction seems irresistible that Sherman and Hood could hardly
have acted in more perfect concert if they had been under the same
commander. The one did exactly what the other wanted, and the
other took care not to interfere with his movement.

At the close of the Atlanta campaign, I promised General Sherman
that I w