he popular delusion, at least
recognized its value. The capture of Atlanta was enough to meet
the "political necessity," make "the election of Mr. Lincoln
certain," and win rejoicings and congratulations from all parts of
the North! It was not worth while to run any risk of trying to do
more at that time! It had to be left for two of Sherman's corps,
after the other four had gone on "the march to the sea," to fight
Hood at Columbia and Spring Hill, hurl him back from Franklin, and
then, with reinforcements not equal to half what Sherman had taken
away, to overwhelm him at Nashville. Why was not this done with
a much larger force under Sherman at Atlanta? This is one of the
questions for the future historian to discuss.

During our rest near Lovejoy's, General Sherman requested me to
give him a statement in writing of my dissent from his decision
upon the question of relative rank, which I did. This he submitted
to the War Department for decision, as a "question of rank that
had arisen between Generals Schofield and Stanley." At this General
Stanley was very indignant, as well as at General Sherman's censure
of his conduct on September 1; for the reason that no question of
rank had been raised by us, and the command was thrust upon him in
opposition to his wish and in violation of the law as he understood
it. In due time came the decision of the War Department, written
by General Halleck, sustaining the view of the law Stanley and I
had taken, and reversing that of General Sherman; also kindly
commending my action in waiving the question during active
operations.

It was by virtue of the above decision of the War Department that
I, instead of General Stanley, had command of the force that in
the following November, 1864, opposed Hood's advance from the
Tennessee River and repulsed his fierce assault at Franklin.

ABSENT FROM THE ARMY

As I was absent from the army on business connected with my department
during most of Hood's raid upon the railroad in the rear of Atlanta
(Sherman having announced his purpose to let his army rest during
that time), I have little to say in respect to the operations
resulting therefrom. But some things in Sherman's account seem to
require a little elucidation.

Being informed by General Sherman of Hood's movement, I hurried to
the front and tried to reach the army by a special train with a
small guard from Cleveland, Ten