ear could not have failed to note the
difference. First there would come an explosion louder and unlike
the report of one or several guns, and this would be followed by
numerous smaller, sharper, and perfectly distinct reports, quite
unlike that of musketry, which could not be mistaken for anything
but the explosion of shells. There could be no room for doubt that
these lights and sounds meant the destruction in Atlanta of magazines
or carloads of fixed ammunition, and hence that Hood was abandoning
that place. I reported my observations and conclusion to General
Sherman, but he "still remained in doubt." The doubt was to me
incomprehensible; but perhaps that was because I had no doubt from
the start, whether I was right or wrong, what the result would be.
My period of elation was when we got firm hold of the railroad at
Rough and Ready. Hood having failed to attack our exposed flank
during the movement, the fall of Atlanta was already an accomplished
fact with me when Sherman was still in doubt, as well as when Thomas
thought the news "too good to be true." But the above is worthy
of noting only as a necessary introduction to something far more
important.

Hood's army was now divided and scattered over a distance of thirty
miles, one corps below Jonesboro' being just driven from its ground
with considerable loss and in retreat to Lovejoy's, the main body
leaving Atlanta and stretched along the road toward McDonough;
while Sherman's whole army, except Slocum's corps, was in compact
order about Jonesboro', nearly in a straight line between Atlanta
and Lovejoy's. This seemed exactly the opportunity to destroy
Hood's army, if that was the objective of the campaign. So anxious
was I that this be attempted that I offered to go with two corps,
or even with one, and intercept Hood's retreat on the McDonough
road, and hold him until Sherman could dispose of Hardee or interpose
his army between him and Hood. But more prudent counsels prevailed,
and we remained quietly in our camps for five days, while Hood
leisurely marched round us with all his baggage and Georgia militia,
and collected his scattered fragments at Lovejoy's.

Atlanta had become, like Richmond, in popular estimation the real
objective of military operations. The public lost sight of the
fact that it was armies in the field, and not fortified places,
which gave strength to the rebellion; and apparently even prominent
generals, if they did not share t