the advice of the general-in-chief, under an act of Congress
passed especially for the purpose, but upon some one who through
political influence or otherwise had got an earlier commission of
major-general. So many of the latter had proved to be unqualified
for responsible command that Congress had enacted a special law
authorizing the President to supersede such prior commissions and
assign commanders of armies or army corps in the field and in any
department whom he deemed competent.( 5) Palpable as this fallacy
seems, yet it was adhered to until overruled by the War Department.

It is proper for me to add that I had at that time but a very slight
personal acquaintance with General Palmer. However, I knew him
well by reputation, and esteemed him highly. General Thomas,
especially, had given me a high estimate of his character and
abilities. If there was any cause of jealousy or ill-feeling
between us, I never suspected it.

[( 1) War Records, Vol. XXXVIII, part iv, p. 558.]

[( 2) War Records, Vol. XXXVIII, part iv, pp. 566 and 568.]

[( 3) Captain A. H. Engle, who was killed at Resaca, was a most
charming and talented youth, only twenty years of age. That was
his first battle. He was caterer of the headquarters mess. That
morning, before leaving camp, Captain Engle made out all his accounts
and handed them, with the money for which he was responsible, to
another staff officer, saying that he was going to be killed that
day.]

[( 4) Vol. II, pp. 80, 81.]

[( 5) Reference is made here to the 122d Article of War, and the
resolution of Congress especially intended to modify it in respect
to command in any "field or department," approved April 4, 1862.]

CHAPTER IX
The Final Blow at Atlanta--Johnston's Untried Plan of Resistance--
Hood's Faulty Move--Holding the Pivot of the Position--Anecdotes
of the Men in the Ranks--Deferring to General Stanley in a Question
of Relative Rank--The Failure at Jonesboro'--The Capture of Atlanta
--Absent from the Army--Hood's Operations in Sherman's Rear--Sent
Back to Thomas's Aid--Faulty Instructions to Oppose Hood at Pulaski
--At Columbia--Reason of the Delay in Exchanging Messages.

When all our efforts to accomplish decisive results by partial
operations upon the flanks had failed, this question was much
discussed: What more decisive movement shall next be made for the
capture of Atlanta? There were practically but two propositions
to be considered: That of Gene